



# A PATHWAY TO A CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT IN 2015: OPTIONS FOR SETTING AND REVIEWING GHG EMISSION REDUCTION OFFERS

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Parties are deliberating the architecture of the 2015 climate change agreement, creating the next set of commitments that draws from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and national experiences to build a regime that is ambitious,<sup>1</sup> fair, and durable. A core part of that architecture, and the focus of this paper, is mitigation, or the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. How should Parties fairly and ambitiously commit to reducing GHG emissions in a way that builds confidence in the international system and that drives collective action in order to keep global temperature rise below 2° Celsius?<sup>2</sup> Previously, the answer focused on two fundamentally different approaches: whether Parties would put forward whatever they were willing to do without international input or guidance or whether Party commitments would be internationally negotiated and determined with little focus on what a country initially put forward. For the post-2020 regime, however, neither approach appears adequate. Instead, we need to bring together the best of each approach and create a new mitigation architecture that both drives ambition and equity and is deeply embedded in national economies. How can we do that? Finding the right mixture between national ownership and multilateral coherence is challenging but essential.

To keep temperature increase limited to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, much greater ambition, particularly from Parties that are currently major GHG emitters (or will be in the decades to come) is required. At the same time, that level of ambition must be shared equitably, taking both past and future contributions to climate change, as well as other factors, into consideration. As each Party considers how it is going to contribute to solving the world’s largest

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collective challenge, questions arise as to how each country should put forward its next emission reduction offer to the global community and what role the international community has in informing the offer of each country. It is clear that every country must facilitate its own national conversation on what constitutes an ambitious and fair offer. The question is: How should the international community facilitate the global conversation on these national offers, noting that the actions of one Party could have a large impact on the realities of many Parties?

The first related question that this paper addresses is: To what extent should international guidance be given to Parties as they put forward their mitigation offers to the international community? If guidance is provided, then a range of questions emerge that can guide this discussion among Parties. For example, what should be the content of such guidance? To whom should the guidance apply? What form should the submissions take?

After reviewing the literature, current practice in the UNFCCC, and other agreements, this paper proposes the idea of “levels” of guidance that start out simply, for example, with a common set of parameters on items such as the greenhouse gases covered by the offers and global warming potentials (GWPs)<sup>3</sup> used and moves to levels of greater complexity. Various ways of interjecting ambition and equity into the process, from start to review, are also considered, as experience has shown that without a systematic and more frequent approach to submitting offers and reviewing them, an agreement will not drive the level of reductions needed to stay below 2°C.

Other questions include: Which Parties should have to put forward offers in the coming months?<sup>4</sup> Should there be some kind of criteria or threshold that separates Parties for whom guidance applies? How can we ensure that Parties have the capacity to put forward offers in the short timeframe ahead of us? After national discussions occur, how should Parties present the information to other Parties?

Building on past discussions, a template could suggest various levels of detail of information, which could be modified or supplemented with additional information and which would facilitate greater understanding of the national circumstances of each country and what it believes it can offer at this time. Putting forward the offers in a timeframe that allows adequate national analysis and consultation and international discussion and review is

tricky. The pros and cons related to the timing of key decisions are also considered in the paper. Once an offer has been presented, how it is reviewed is a key question that goes to the core of what level of international engagement Parties are prepared to welcome in the formulation of their offers. Building on existing practice in the Convention, and providing some innovative ideas for consideration, the paper outlines options how to ensure an effective and manageable review before final commitments are made at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris in 2015 and considers options for future reviews in a way that drives greater ambition.

## INTRODUCTION

Parties to the UNFCCC have set 2015 as a deadline for an agreement to reduce GHG emissions before and after 2020 to a level that would keep the increase in global temperatures below 2°C compared with preindustrial levels.<sup>5</sup> Many elements are crucial to reaching a successful agreement, including finance, adaptation, and technology transfer. This paper focuses on mitigation of GHG emissions and enhancement of sinks,<sup>6</sup> specifically on how to develop a process that would encourage Parties to achieve the highest possible level of ambition with regard to GHG emission reductions for the period after 2020.

The literature and Party submissions over the past decade reflect a wide range of approaches on how to establish mitigation commitments. Many experts and Parties have put forward ideas on how commitments should be derived, reviewed, eventually verified, as well as parameters to determine which Party takes on which level of reductions.<sup>7</sup> Before moving forward to develop new emission reduction offers, most Parties to the Convention will want to know the “rules of the game,” that is, who should submit offers, what should be in a new offer, how will it be reviewed, and what measures will be used to determine whether an offer has been fulfilled.<sup>8</sup> The purpose of this paper is to unpack these issues and to identify options for a process to submit and review offers<sup>9</sup> by Parties to reduce their GHG emissions. It is expected that the final offers from Parties will be imbedded in a 2015 agreement for the years after 2020 and could serve as a model for subsequent offers that would be agreed in an iterative process after 2015. We believe that such a process should promote transparent, comparable, and comprehensive accounting so as to determine whether a 2°C goal can be achieved collectively and fairly, based on the respective capabilities of Parties. It is anticipated that the best time to begin to develop these

“rules of the game” will be at the 19th Conference of the Parties (COP 19) in Warsaw in 2013 since only two years remain before COP 21 in Paris.

## STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

This paper is structured around a number of key issues:

- Should there be international guidance for the submission of offers by Parties? If so, what should be the content of such guidance with regard to ambition and equity? To whom should guidance apply?
- What information should be included in an offer by Parties?
- How should information be submitted?
- When should Parties submit their offers?
- How should the offers be reviewed? How should equity be treated in a review process?
- What process should be used to finalize the offer?
- What process should be used to review the offers after 2015 with a view toward increasing ambition?

This paper tries to avoid being prescriptive. It attempts to present options and their implications for consideration by Parties and interested observers. The paper focuses only on mitigation and only on mitigation offers in the form of national, sectoral, or policy targets. It does not focus on nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) formed in terms of individual projects. This is not to imply that countries that have not formulated national, sectoral, or policy offers should not strive to do so. The paper does not address long-term finance, adaptation, land-use, technology, or capacity building; agreement on each of these issues will be essential if a comprehensive agreement is to be signed by all Parties. In addition, capacity issues of many developing countries need to be addressed so they can produce the required information. The importance of capacity building is recognized, but not explored in detail.

## LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE ON THE AMBITION AND EQUITY OF THE OFFER

This section addresses the level of guidance on the ambition and equity of the offer and to whom guidance should apply. These issues are linked as Parties try to determine

whether to support multilaterally negotiated guidance. Indeed, Parties are unlikely to respond positively to the first question—should guidance be provided on the ambition and equity of the offer?—unless they have some idea as to what will be in the guidance and to whom it may apply. These questions are, therefore, treated as a package.

Some will ask, why should guidance be developed, when it would be easier for each country to simply submit whatever it is capable of doing in any format? The authors believe that the principal reason for international guidance is to encourage Parties to develop and consider commitments that would make it more likely that global temperatures would not exceed 2°C. Guidance is needed to promote transparency and comparability of offers and to facilitate a review of national submissions, as discussed in later sections. If properly designed, international guidance can also promote equity among Parties and environmental integrity, shield national regulators from appeals for exceptions by national industries,<sup>10</sup> and, in most cases, increase transparency. The disadvantages are that guidance may be hard to revise, can lead to the lowest common denominator, and, if poorly designed, fail to adequately take into consideration national circumstances. It can also be held hostage to international politics.

### What should be the level of guidance on the level of ambition of the offer?

The ultimate target of the Convention is to avert dangerous anthropogenic interference. Parties have since agreed to the target of limiting warming to 2°C, with the potential for revising the target to 1.5°C based on the 2013–2015 scientific review.<sup>11</sup> Will international guidance be used to assess Parties’ offers in relationship to these targets? Will guidance assure that individual and collective ambition is in line with emissions trajectories consistent with temperature targets?

It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the type of offer put forward (baseline versus intensity versus base year targets (see Annex)), which could play a critical role in determining the ambition of the offer. Instead in this section, we focus on a higher-level discussion of the emission levels associated with the offers.

Three options exist regarding international guidance on the level of ambition of the offer:

**Option 1:** Parties put forward their offers based on domestic factors, and little guidance is provided on the level of ambition of such offers. Under this approach,

Parties would not have to formally justify the level of ambition of their offer. This approach was taken for the Copenhagen pledges; Parties' pledges were not informed by any international guidance on the level of ambition. While this approach allows for significant flexibility and consideration of national circumstances, there is little chance that the emission reductions associated with the offers will be sufficient to meet temperature targets. For example, the current pledges for 2020 fall 8–13 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub>e) short of having a likely chance of meeting the 2°C target<sup>12</sup> because they were designed in isolation of a global reduction target.

**Option 2:** “Domestic ambition benchmarks” would be created, and each Party would provide information on how its offer contributes to limiting warming. While it is not possible to do so in relation to the 2°C, or 1.5°C, target without knowledge of other Parties' offers, a Party's justification for its level of ambition could demonstrate how the Party attempted to maximize ambition. For example, the offer could be compared with national mitigation assessments, showing that the offer matches the Party's mitigation potential (available technologies and practices that could have the capacity to mitigate climate change in the jurisdiction). The advantage of this approach is that it allows for flexibility while requiring Parties to justify and consider their ambition level. The disadvantage is that even if ambition is considered at the national level and all Parties' use mitigation assessments as the basis for their offers, the collective ambition could fall short of the necessary emission reductions.

**Option 3:** “International ambition benchmarks” would be established, indicating a range of emission reductions levels to be considered by a Party or set of Parties based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report. This option would require a translation of targets and policies into absolute emission reductions. For example, if a Party has adopted a baseline scenario target, the baseline would need to be fixed *ex ante*<sup>13</sup> to assess the expected emission reductions associated with the target range. The guidance could also indicate when emissions should peak and a range of rates of decline afterward. This method would provide greater certainty that a 2°C temperature goal could be achieved. If Parties found that they could not achieve the range, they could be required to justify and explain their position. The significant advantage of this option is

that it would increase the probability that a certain ambition level would be achieved; the disadvantage is that it would not provide much flexibility and could potentially lead to less participation.

## What should be the level of guidance on the level of equity of the offer?

Multiple levels of guidance are possible with regard to the level of equity of the offer. As with level of ambition, there are three fundamental choices: providing little guidance, allowing countries to come forward with their own description of how their offer is equitable, or developing international equity benchmarks with criteria Parties must consider in describing their offers. This choice set is similar to that related to ambition, but the level of guidance related to ambition does not necessarily have to be the same as that related to equity.

**Option 1:** Under this option, little guidance would be put forth on how equity should be addressed in the offers.

**Option 2:** Parties would have to come forward with information on how their offer takes equity into account. A Party would describe the benchmarks it had used in assessing equity and how they were employed. A Party could use any criteria to describe equity. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for flexibility while requiring Parties to justify and consider the equity of their offers.

**Option 3:** As opposed to the domestic benchmarks used in Option 2, Option 3 would employ international benchmarks, which would include a basket of criteria and/or quantitative and qualitative indicators covering emission responsibility, capability, vulnerability, development needs, relative costs of action, and the benefits of action.<sup>14</sup> Parties would have to consider and report against these criteria to justify the equity of their offers.

## To whom should guidance apply?

Who participates in a future agreement will determine its environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. At one extreme, participation can be universal, but lead to very little activity; at the other extreme, participation can be limited to just two countries, but such a regime would not be environmentally effective, economically efficient, or politically acceptable. Participation can also be differentiated in tiers whereby States participating

in the same tier would have the same type of commitments. Parties could also be given the flexibility to “graduate” from one tier of commitments to the next, and participation could be mandatory or voluntary.<sup>15</sup> In the case of the UNFCCC, it is well recognized that Parties’ commitments should be in keeping with equity and their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. To date, the most important tiers of countries have been Annex I and non-Annex I countries, but there are also special arrangements for economies in transition as well as the special needs of the least developed countries and small island states. The Durban decision to include all countries under the 2015 deal may lead to other modes of differentiation among Parties.

If the COP determines that some form of guidance is needed, to whom should the guidance (on a range of issues outlined below) apply? There are several ways to approach this issue.

**Option 1:** Informally formulate expectations among major emitters as to which Parties would develop different types of targets without putting these expectations into a document adopted by the COP.

**Option 2:** Parties agree that basic reporting guidance (see Level 1 in next section on reporting) would apply to all Parties that adopted national or sectoral targets at COP 16 in Cancun in 2010. This option would reduce contentiousness and be the most practical given the limited time before COP 21. More prescriptive guidance on the level of ambition and equity could apply to a select number of Parties based on criteria yet to be defined. Parties that pledged to undertake NAMAs could continue to provide information to the NAMA registry. However, as their economies expand and emissions increase to an intensity level equal to the lowest level of a Party with current sectoral targets, these Parties could be encouraged to take on sectoral targets and provided with incentives to do so.

**Option 3:** The COP could adopt formal screens that would apply to all Parties and help determine which countries should undertake which form of guidance in terms of ambition, equity, and reporting obligations (see next section). Screens, for example, could help establish which Parties adopt economy-wide targets and could be based on the share of current global emissions, the share of cumulative global emissions over a

particular time, or a rate of emission growth. A second screen might determine which countries should take on some form of sectoral or policy commitments. Such a screen might include: the global share of a sectoral emissions, technological efficiency of the sector vs. a global baseline, or the single most important emission sector in a country. Agreeing on screens could be controversial in the short term, although necessary in the long run. Different schedules or timetables might govern when Parties put forth submissions that address sectors or the entire economy.

## LEVEL OF GUIDANCE ON REPORTING THE OFFER

Once a Party determines its offer, it must present it internationally to other Parties. The requirements for the content of an offer submission will be of paramount importance to many Parties, while the format of the submission will be most important to other Parties. In part, the level of guidance on reporting the offer will depend on the level of guidance on the offer as discussed in the above section. If international guidance is advanced, less information will need to be provided by Parties. For example, if the level of ambition is determined internationally, then less information needs to be provided by the Party.

A wide range of topics could be included in international guidance on reporting requirements related to the offer.

**Figure 1** shows the types of possible guidance in four levels of reporting obligations, as well as decisions made in the first section on the levels of ambition and equity.

The differences among the four levels as shown in **Figure 1**<sup>16</sup> are

- **Level 1:** Basic reporting guidance: The guidance would list a set of simple reporting requirements similar to those currently used by developed countries to clarify their current targets.<sup>17</sup> See **Table 1** for a complete list.
- **Level 2:** Basic reporting guidance plus additional reporting topics: The guidance would build on Level 1 and require reporting on a few additional factors, such as emissions projections and costs. Parties reporting under level 2 would also have to justify their level of equity and ambition using domestic benchmarks (See Option 2 in above sections).

Figure 1 | **Four Levels of Guidance on Reporting an Offer**

	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	LEVEL 4
Type of information	Type of target, GHG and sectoral coverage, GWP, GHG Inventory method, time period, target level, geographic boundary, estimated base year emissions, use of offsets, land-use accounting approach and effects, and for policy-based offers detailed description, assessment period, net change in GHG emissions and total in-jurisdiction effects	Macroeconomic and marginal cost of achieving target, estimated emissions in 2025 and 2030, explanation for level of ambition, explanation for how offer is equitable	Method and data sources to determine base year emissions and GWP, detailed description of projection method, detailed description of LULUCF accounting method; detailed description of methods used for transferable emissions units; a detailed description of method for policy-based offers; a description of methods used to estimate costs; list of equity indicators used to assess equity	Prescribed target range, peaking year and rate of change in emissions; proposed target, peaking year and rate of change in emissions; any difference between prescribed and proposed target, peaking year and rate; prescribed accounting rules; description of how these rules are taken into account; any difference between the prescribed rules and use of rules
Form of submission	Modified Template		Supplemental Report	Modified Template or Report
To whom does it apply	Mandatory for countries with national and sectoral targets	Based on capability to do so		
When applicable	2015	2015 or schedule	Based on schedule	

Source: World Resources Institute.

- **Level 3:** Detailed reporting guidance: The guidance would expand on the topics reported in Level 2 and require detailed reporting about assumptions and methodologies underlying the offer, including accounting procedures. Additionally, justification for how the offer is equitable would be provided in a more detailed manner against internationally agreed criteria.
- **Level 4:** Guidance that prescribes target ranges: The guidance would no longer be framed solely around reporting obligations but would prescribe how Parties carry out various aspects of the target design, for example, the level of emission reductions to be reached.

Accordingly, the simplest type of guidance—Level 1—identifies a limited set of reporting parameters. It would not prescribe a type of pledge (see Annex) or a level of ambition or take into account how the offer is equitable. The reporting requirements would be based on a common set of parameters, for example, coverage of greenhouse gases, GWPs, GHG inventory methodologies, and target dates or period for the offer. See **Table 1** for a detailed list. This level could also require the Party to indicate whether it intends to use domestic or international offsets or carry-over credits, and how land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) will be accounted for (activity or land-based). The international community has been able to reach agreement on a nearly similar set as translated into a template to clarify Cancun pledges made by developed countries.<sup>18</sup> To meet the requirements of Level 1, the capacity issues of many developing countries would need to be addressed so they can put forward such information, as the current reporting template applies to developed countries only.

The effort under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to clarify the Cancun pledges has noted that different methods and ways of estimating and reporting information on the use of LULUCF and international offsets makes comparisons of information from Parties particularly difficult. This paper assumes that reaching agreement on international methods to estimate such reductions will continue to be difficult in the short time before COP 21. Consequently Level 1 requires Parties to simply report the estimated level of emission reductions anticipated from the use of LULUCF and international offsets and does not advance harmonized methodology and accounting rules for such issues. Level 1 does

not go much beyond the existing reporting requirements for developed countries but it would require an additional effort for some countries. Level 1 also includes some basic reporting requirements for policy-based offers.

Level 2 provides an expanded set of guidance that could be requested of Parties “in a position to do so,” and would include an additional set of reporting aspects: (1) the macroeconomic/marginal costs likely to be incurred by a Party to achieve its national or sectoral target(s);<sup>19</sup> (2) projections of GHGs emissions to the years 2025 and 2030;<sup>20</sup> (3) the Party’s justification for how its offer addresses ambition; and (4) the Party’s justification for how its offer addresses equity. On the first aspect, information on costs would be helpful in assessing the fairness of the offers, particularly from developed countries. Regarding the second, information on projections, particularly from developing countries, would help to determine whether the cumulative change in emissions would enable a 2°C target to be achieved. In addition, Parties would have to demonstrate how they attempted to maximize ambition and equity. The information in Level 2 goes beyond what is required currently. The additional information could be included in an expanded template.

Level 3 takes reporting a significant step further. It would request that Parties provide detailed information on the data reported in Levels 1 and 2, particularly details on methods and assumptions to estimate, for example, costs, projections, LULUCF effects and offsets, and the effects of policies. Parties would also be requested to explain the methods used to account for the estimated net changes in emissions provided in Level 1. In addition, rather than simply reporting how the Party addressed equity in Level 2, Level 3 would include examples of criteria against which the Party reported on how its offer is equitable (see Option 3 related to equity). The offers reported under Level 3 would result in a high degree of confidence about the level of effort and ambition particularly among Parties with similar circumstances. The information could be provided in a supplemental report along with all assumptions and references.

Level 4 would be prescriptive and would go beyond simply reporting how the offer addresses ambition. It would prescribe the level of emission reduction associated with the target (see Option 3 under ambition) as well as various accounting issues.<sup>21</sup>

Table 1 | Information to be Provided by Parties with National and Sectoral Targets in a Modified Template

<b>Level 1</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The type of target (base year target; intensity target (unit of output); baseline target; or fixed level target). See Annex for definitions.</li> <li>■ Greenhouse gases to be covered and the IPCC tier</li> <li>■ Global warming potentials (GWPs) used</li> <li>■ GHG inventory methods to be used</li> <li>■ Range of economic activity to be covered by the target             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ If based on sectors, which sectors and subsectors are included in the target boundary and definitions of sectors if differ from IPCC definitions</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ Time period of target: single year or multiyear             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ If a single-year target, the target year; if a multiyear period, the target period</li> <li>□ The base year of base period, if any</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ Target level, expressed in terms of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub>e)<sup>22</sup></li> <li>■ The geographic boundary</li> <li>■ The estimated base year emissions for all sectors and gases</li> <li>■ Expected use of domestic and international offsets</li> <li>■ The adopted land-use sector approach and effect on emissions or reductions in CO<sub>2</sub>e</li> <li>■ For policy-based offers:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ Detailed description of the policy or action (e.g., type of policy instrument; status of implementation; affected sectors, sources, and gases; time period over which the policy is expected to be implemented)<sup>23</sup></li> <li>□ The GHG assessment period<sup>24</sup></li> <li>□ The estimated total net change in GHG emissions and removals resulting from the policy/action (i.e., the difference between the baseline scenario and the policy scenario), in metric tons of CO<sub>2</sub>e—annually and cumulatively over the GHG assessment period</li> <li>□ Total in-jurisdiction GHG effects (i.e., the total net change in GHG emissions and removals that occurs within the implementing jurisdiction’s geopolitical boundary), separate from total out-of-jurisdiction GHG effects</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Level 2</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Estimated macroeconomic and marginal cost of achieving the target</li> <li>■ Estimated GHG emissions in 2025 and 2030 for the entire economy or selected sector</li> <li>■ An explanation by the Party for the level of ambition of its offer</li> <li>■ An explanation by the Party of how its offer is equitable</li> </ul>

Table 1 | **Information to be Provided by Parties with National and Sectoral Targets in a Modified Template** (Continued)

<b>Level 3</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The method and data sources used to determine base year emissions (or intensity), as well as the GWP values used</li> <li>■ A description of the projection method used to estimate emissions in 2025 and 2030:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ The estimated target baseline scenario emission level</li> <li>□ Whether the baseline scenario is static or dynamic (e.g., can be adjusted during target period)</li> <li>□ All emissions drivers included in the baseline scenario, and related assumptions and data sources</li> <li>□ Which policies and actions are included and excluded from the baseline scenario and methods used to estimate their effects</li> <li>□ The cut-off year for the baseline scenario, at which point no new policies or actions are included</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ A description of the method for estimating LULUCF:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ The mitigation target level both with and without the impact of land-use sector accounting</li> <li>□ The mitigation target level both with and without the impact of land-based accounting and activity-based accounting</li> <li>□ Any use of the managed land proxy, including the definition of “managed land,” if adopted</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ A description of the methods to be used to estimate emission reduction units of domestic or international offsets:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ Including the estimated use of transferable emission units and quantification methodology used and an explanation of the provisions in place to ensure that transferable emission units are not double counted</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ For policy-based offers:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ Any standard, guidance, or methodology followed to estimate the GHG effects resulting from the policy or action</li> <li>□ A list of the effects included in the assessment, including in-jurisdiction effects, out-of-jurisdiction effects (e.g., leakage), intended effects, unintended effects, short-term and long-term effects, and any potential GHG effects excluded from the assessment with justification for their exclusion</li> <li>□ A list of GHG sources and sinks and greenhouse gases included in the GHG assessment, and any potential GHG sources and sinks and greenhouse gases excluded from the GHG assessment, with justification for their exclusion</li> <li>□ A description of the baseline scenario and baseline emissions and removals, the methodology and assumptions used to estimate baseline emissions and removals, including the emissions estimation methods or models used, drivers included in the baseline scenario, and all sources of data used, including activity data, emission factors, GWP values, and assumptions</li> <li>□ A list of implemented or adopted policies and actions included in the baseline scenario, and any implemented or adopted policies, actions, or projects excluded from the baseline scenario, with justification for their exclusion</li> <li>□ A description of the policy scenario and policy scenario emissions and removals, the methodology and assumptions used to estimate policy scenario emissions, including the emissions estimation methods or models used and all sources of data used, including activity data, emission factors, GWP values, and assumptions</li> <li>□ Any potential overlaps or interactions with other policies and actions, and whether and how policy interactions were estimated with justification for the approach used</li> <li>□ A quantitative estimate or qualitative description of the uncertainty of the results</li> <li>□ Any possible double counting of GHG reductions by other Parties that may claim GHG reductions from the same policies or actions, and any practices or precautions used to avoid double counting</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ A description of the methods used to estimate costs, including all relevant assumptions</li> <li>■ A list of equity indicators used by the Party in assessing equity and how the Party responded to those indicators<sup>25</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Level 4</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The prescribed national or sectoral target range,<sup>26</sup> the peaking years and the rate of change in emissions, given the range for consideration by individual Parties in formulating the submission, review of adequacy and equity</li> <li>■ The proposed national or sectoral target,<sup>27</sup> the peaking years and the rate of change in emissions</li> <li>■ An explanation of any differences between the first and second bullets above</li> <li>■ The prescribed accounting rules for consideration by individual Parties in formulating the submission</li> <li>■ An explanation of how these accounting rules are taken into account in the offer</li> <li>■ An explanation of any differences between the above two bullets</li> </ul>

Accordingly, the Parties can consider options for the degree of guidance to be provided for offers largely corresponding to the four levels. Note that options 1 through 4 are not mutually exclusive but could be undertaken together, with some options pertaining to the majority of Parties and others to select Parties. For example various levels could apply to different Parties, with Level 1 applying to all Parties who have previously submitted national and sectoral targets and Level 4 applying to a select number of Parties based on criteria yet to be defined.

**Table 1** gives a list of information to be provided by Parties with national and sectoral targets.

## LEVEL OF GUIDANCE ON THE FORMAT FOR SUBMISSION OF THE OFFER

After identifying the information that must be provided in an offer, the COP must decide the format for the submission of the offer. It is anticipated that any guidance issued by the COP would consider existing relevant decisions agreed to by the COP. The most relevant of these requires developed country Parties to submit biennial reports (BRs) by the beginning of 2014 and developing country Parties to submit biennial update reports (BURs) at the end of 2014. For developed countries, the reports are intended to provide a snapshot of progress made in implementing actions, projections of future GHG emissions, planned policies and actions.<sup>28</sup> Developing country Parties' BURs are not expected to be forward looking and will not include projections. Since neither BRs nor BURs explicitly include a requirement for the submission of a new offer, they are unlikely to be the most appropriate format to capture Parties' offers.

If the BRs and BURs are not a clear avenue forward, how should information on an offer be provided so it is clear, unambiguous, and builds trust with other Parties while minimizing the reporting burden on Parties? The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) set a precedent when it invited Parties in its Decision -/CP.17 paragraph 5(a) to clarify their commitments by using a simple template developed by the chair of the AWG-LCA to provide information on global warming potentials, the anticipated role of LULUCF, carbon credits from market mechanisms, assumptions and conditions relating to ambition of the pledge and supporting policies and measures. Many, but not all, Parties responded to this invitation.

Several options could be considered for submitting such information, each providing more complete information. For example, Parties could be required to:

**Option 1:** Use the template referred to in Level 1, with modifications to account for the supplemental reporting tables for the BRs adopted at COP 18.

**Option 2:** Use a revised template that includes the information requested by Level 2.

**Option 3:** Provide a supplemental report, possibly in conjunction with a revised template, to provide the detailed information on the methods, assumptions and other information requested by Levels 3 and 4.

The aim should be to minimize the work required to guide the provision of clear and transparent information. The supplemental reports would add a unique effort for all Parties, but a precedent has been established for the submission of such reports in the case of GHG inventory information for Annex I Parties. As noted previously, some developing countries would need support to build capacity.

## GUIDANCE ON THE TIMING OF THE OFFER

In considering a date for the submission of new offers, there is a need to consider the existing "review" processes established by the COP as their beginning and ending may affect views on when new offers should be submitted. These review processes are identified in the section on reviews below. There may also be a need to consider external events such as the UN Secretary General's summit with heads of state in 2014, elections in key countries, and ministerial meetings that could emerge over the next 24 months.

The capacities of developing countries also need to be taken into consideration. The limited amount of time to generate offers by COP 21 may jeopardize Parties' ability to support an iterative process, especially if a comprehensive set of guidelines or additional rules would be required to generate the first offer. A trade-off could be to have the first offers generated on the basis of existing guidelines while the second offer would require additional, specific information.

There appears to be three choices for the submittal of the first offers:

- Prior to the meeting of the Secretary General in September 2014
- At the end of 2014
- In the middle of 2015

The first timeframe would enable the Secretary General to urge key heads of state to increase the ambition of their offers before the end of 2015. This deadline would allow the maximum time for an international and domestic review of the offers. The second would come at the conclusion of the SBSTA work program to clarify offers (see below) and allow Parties to take advantage of the lessons learned from that process. If the work program is extended into 2015 and the mandate expanded, then submissions at the end of 2014


may allow time for a substantial review. A deadline of mid-2015 would leave only four to five months for a review process and appears to be too late for an adequate discussion of each offer and allows very little time for reconsideration by a Party.

## LEVEL OF GUIDANCE ON THE REVIEW OF THE OFFER

This section addresses the following questions:

- How should offers be reviewed?
- What process should be used to finalize the offers?
- How should equity be treated in the review process?
- What process should be used to review the offers after 2015?

Figure 2 | Options for Reviewing Offers



The goal of a review process should be to provide all Parties with clear information about the level of ambition incorporated into the offer of a country, the national circumstances influencing the offer, how the offer of one Party compares with those of others and the extent to which the collective offers will close the emission gap and, therefore, limit the global temperature increase to about 2°C. Additionally, a review process should encourage greater ambition and build trust among Parties that a future agreement will be fair. To achieve these goals, we suggest that a review process needs to be transparent, facilitative, efficient, and cost effective.

To be as efficient as possible, a strong case can be made for an international review process that takes advantage of or builds on one of the existing processes established by the COP as described in the options below. In considering these options, Parties may wish to review the original mandate and purpose of the review, institutional arrangements, and the start and end date of the review. To be cost effective, consideration should be given to grouping reviews based on the type of target, for example undertaking reviews of all Parties with national targets together and reviews of Parties with sectoral targets together. Since time for undertaking reviews is likely to be short, priority could be based on

Table 2 | **Comparison of Possible Review Options**

	OPTION 1: BUILDING ON ICA/IAR	OPTION 2: USING THE CLARIFICATION OF PLEDGES PROCESS	OPTION 3: BUILDING ON PERIOD REVIEW	OPTION 4: NEW PROCESS
Timing	Not ideal, especially late for developing countries	Supposed to finish by end of 2014—many offers may come up in 2015, but could be extended	The timing could, in principle, be aligned with the period of review of offers. However, the start of the periodic review has already been delayed.	If Parties agree on the process by COP 19, the timing could be appropriate; otherwise it may be too late.
Scope	Technical No direct link to equity	Limited to mitigation only No link to equity	Limited (mostly technical, with different mandate) No direct link to equity	Supposed to be aligned with the scope
Facilitative Process	Yes	Yes	Uncertain	Recommendation is that the international component is facilitative
Cost	Experts and process not fully specified but could add to costs—not yet totally funded	Minimum—if workshops are used	Experts and process not yet fully specified	Additional to existing process—hence likely to be expensive

■ Promoting factor     
 ■ Limiting factor     
 □ Obstructive factor

indicators such as percent of global emissions, per capita emissions, or emissions intensity.

As shown in **Figure 2**, the review of countries' offers could build on existing procedures (Options 1, 2 and 3) or consist of a new process (Option 4):

**Option 1 (Building on ICA/IAR):** The review of offers would be integrated into the technical evaluations recently adopted under the UNFCCC: the International Assessment and Review (IAR) process agreed at COP 16 for developed countries' emissions and removals related to quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets, their policies and measures, as well as the support they provide to developing countries. The IAR process will likely commence in 2014. A parallel process for developing countries, with a focus on their national inventories, their NAMAs and the support they received, is to be finalized by COP 19. This process, called International Consultation and Analysis (ICA), is yet to be finalized and is due to start in 2015.

**Option 2 (Using the Clarification of Pledges Process):** The review of offers would be integrated into the "clarification of pledges" workshops. This would be part of the two-year work program agreed at COP 18 under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and SBSTA to clarify Parties' pledges. This work program has begun and will end in 2014. It is to include focused expert meetings, technical briefings and submissions from Parties and observer organizations. The two-year work program will report on its progress to COP 19 and report on its outcome at COP 20.<sup>29</sup>

**Option 3 (Building on Periodic Review):** The review of offers would be integrated into the periodic review agreed at COP 16 of the adequacy of the long-term goal in light of the ultimate objective of the Convention and the overall progress toward achieving it in accordance with the relevant principles and provisions of the Convention. The first review was to start in 2013 and should be completed by 2015, using the outcome of the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report.

**Option 4 (New Process):** The review of offers would consist of a new process that would build on the experience of the three processes described above and would determine whether and/or how to integrate equity issues into a review (see discussion below). This review could be done in conjunction with one or more of the existing review processes mentioned above or as

a separate process. Options for a new review process include:


- Using an electronic bulletin board on which Parties and stakeholders could post comments and the Party could respond.
- Empowering NGOs or independent "think tanks" meeting criteria approved by the COP to undertake reviews that the COP would recognize.
- Relying on a domestic review that would be reported to and recognized by the COP. This option could be complementary to an international review. A national review could enable domestic stakeholders and possibly invited international experts to engage government officials regarding the detailed assumptions underlying an offer. The outcome of such a review is difficult to predict, but the end product is likely to have greater political support within the country. It could strengthen the case made by each country concerning the rationale for their offer.

Any of the processes would be enhanced if the Secretariat were requested to synthesize the offers and provide an assessment of how close the offers come to filling the gap in emission reductions needed to achieve a 2°C target (possibly with the help of an international group of experts).

As mentioned above, and reflected in **Table 2**, each option has pros and cons. The options are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. In view of the limited time left for Parties to adopt a process for assessing the mitigation offers and subsequently to adopt commitments in an agreement by December 2015, Parties may consider leveraging existing international and domestic processes and complement them through the scenario shown in **Figure 3** and described below:

- Generate understanding of the offer by using the process and/or outcome of the technical assessments under the IAR and ICA.
- Encourage Parties to undertake domestic consultations.
- Ensure wider stakeholder engagement by collecting their feedback, questions or comments using an electronic bulletin board.
- Use the output generated by the elements mentioned above to facilitate a political consultation on countries' offers.

Figure 3 | **Scenario for Domestic Consultations, Multistakeholder Engagement, and International Technical and Political Assessment**



### Identifying the basis for a review

Before agreeing to a modified review process, Parties are likely to want to know which indicators will be used to assess their offers. The following questions could be considered:

- Did the country provide all the information required in the template(s) and/or in a supplemental report? If the submission is incomplete, did the Party indicate why and when it would be completed?
- What is the proposed rate of emission reductions using different base years and over different time periods?
- What is the extent of emission reductions with and without the use of LULUCF and using different accounting methods?
- What is the likely range of emission reductions from the use of international offsets?
- What was the basis for assessing equity and what was determined as a result of an assessment?
- What is the total amount of GHG emissions in 2020, 2030, and beyond vs. emission pathways consistent with various temperature limits (1.5°C or 2°C)? Is the emission gap closed and, if not, what more needs to be done?<sup>30</sup>

### Treating equity in a review process

Equity issues are integral to addressing mitigation objectives yet involve distinct issues. Either a separate equity review could be established to assess how Parties' equity has been taken into account in setting mitigation objectives or it can be integrated into a comprehensive review. For the sake of efficiency and given the limited time before COP 21, we assume that consideration of equity should be integrated into one review process. A review could look into how a Party addressed a basket of criteria and/or quantitative and qualitative indicators such as emission responsibility, capability, vulnerability, development needs, relative costs of action, and the benefits of action. A framework for such an equity review could either focus on mitigation efforts alone, or could consider adaptation and support as well.

This review could be based on a framework agreed within the UNFCCC or developed less formally outside the UNFCCC. An approach outside the UNFCCC would require a tacit understanding among Parties as to how a review or reviews would be conducted and reported to the COP and who would conduct the review. Who develops the framework and how it is developed would be critical factors for its credibility. The review process would need

to be seen as technically and politically neutral if developed by an independent group of experts or organizations. A framework developed within the UNFCCC could provide more ownership and buy-in by countries, but if all Parties are unable to reach agreement on criteria, it runs the risk of failing. A UNFCCC review process may also require the creation of a technical body to define the framework against which Parties' offers may be judged.

Since developing such a review framework could be time-consuming, alternatively, each country could independently decide which indicators would be the most relevant in determining the equitability of its offer as indicated in Level 2 of the reporting guidance. In this case, a technical review of the offers would check whether the equity principles were met in accordance with the latest science (keeping us on track to keep temperature increase to less than 2°C), rather than focusing on whether the indicators are the appropriate ones.<sup>31</sup> However, indicators selected at the national level will not enable comparability of efforts, as each country might give prominence to indicators most favorable to its circumstances. For this option to work effectively, transparency would be essential: each country would need to explain the set of indicators and the methodology used, and some record of the review would need to be provided.

### What is the process to finalize an offer?

How might this stage of the process proceed if the goals of the review are to be achieved? Having made a submission and been subject to oral and/or written questions (as part of the consultation mentioned above), Parties will need to determine whether and how to respond. Three options are identified below.

**Option 1:** Parties could internally assess the comments, but have no requirement to provide a formal response.

**Option 2:** Parties could be mandated to respond by providing additional information, without a requirement to resubmit their offer; and

**Option 3:** Parties could be requested to respond to the comments and to resubmit an offer, which could be the same as the original offer and/or explain why it is not feasible to submit a new offer.

The second and third choices are the most likely to build trust among Parties even if the response is incomplete. It would be highly desirable for Parties to submit their responses prior to COP 21; however, in practice there is

nothing to prevent a Party from resubmitting an offer at any time up to the close of COP 21.

### Process of review beyond 2015

The historical approach whereby developed countries made pledges in 1997 and all Parties were invited to make pledges in 2009 has allowed too much time to pass. In the interim, changes in national circumstances affected projections and political changes affected the resolve of national governments creating uncertainties among the business community, investors, and the public. During this time, global emissions increased nearly unabated, the "emission gap" widened, and technological "lock-in" occurred in many countries. The COP in 2015 should provide a basis for continuous review and consideration of offers—not one that occurs every 10–15 years.

The new agreement should include a consistent, long-term mechanism that promotes ambition over time. This ratchet-up mechanism could require regular review as well as provisions that allow for revisions of rules, procedures, and targets, that encourage governments to step forward at nearly any time as the politics in a country change, and that provide an incentive mechanism.

A ratchet-up mechanism for the period beyond 2015 will need to consider the experiences and learning incurred from the process leading up to 2015, the IAR and ICA processes to review national communications, the BRs or BURs, the IPCC reports, and the review of adequacy. There are four options:

**Option 1:** Submission of offers by Parties every two years as they submit their BR and BURs

**Option 2:** Submission of offers in conjunction with national communications

**Option 3:** Submission of offers on a continuous basis as driven by national circumstance/domestic policy processes, but no longer than every five years

**Option 4:** Automatic ratcheting-up (e.g., if the emission inventory of a country is below the target for a number of consecutive years, the target is automatically set at that lower level).<sup>32</sup>

A submission of offers every two years would force Parties, as they contemplated the results of their implementation actions, to determine whether adjustments in their offers are warranted, and could lead to more frequent increases in ambition. A submission every four years would be more

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aligned with the changes in most governments, closer to the frequency of IPCC reports, and could be part of the UNFCCC periodic reviews. Submissions on a continuous basis would remove an implicit barrier that leads Parties to assume that submissions need only be considered when a major negotiation is held. This option would also lessen the organizational burden that arises when submissions are bunched together. However, it leaves open the possibility that, without a deadline, Parties will never submit new offers.

Any agreement on frequency ought to be reflected in a calendar to 2030 and beyond to demonstrate the seriousness of the international community, particularly to the business community, that emission reduction measures will be a priority for all countries well into this century. Submission of a revised offer would be subject to a review regardless of when it is submitted. The frequency of the submission of the offers beyond 2015 could also be differentiated among countries. This differentiation could make a ratchet-up mechanism more manageable as the highest emitters would be expected to increase their offers more frequently.

A more systematic or automatic approach, could build from lessons from the Montreal Protocol. Indeed, the Montreal Protocol set up an “adjustment” procedure based on a schedule to accelerate the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances, which avoided the need for treaty amendments.<sup>33</sup> Haites et al.<sup>34</sup> propose the adoption of a similar process for a future agreement. They suggest that initial national commitments for the first period of the post-2020 regime should occur by 2015.<sup>25</sup> Commitments for a subsequent period should be submitted two years prior to the start of that period. Such an automatic ratchet would enable Parties to respond more promptly to new scientific information.

Besides, the process for a ratchet-up mechanism could be linked to a facilitative compliance mechanism to encourage countries to take further action. It could allow countries to see what others have put forward, ask questions, and seek clarification. This process would allow countries to compare offers and determine whether their offer would give them a competitive disadvantage compared with another country’s mitigation commitments. Since actions by some developing countries are contingent on support, the review process would probably need to include the provision of finance, technology, and capacity building.

In the long term, reporting and peer pressure may not be sufficient to force countries to ratchet-up their ambition, and the process may need to be supported by a set of incentives for countries that need support, e.g., access to carbon markets, use of domestic and/or private sector finance, and enhancing cooperation in other fora, such as positive trade preferences.

In conclusion, a ratchet-up mechanism should be one of the elements of a 2015 agreement. At COP 20, Parties ideally will agree broadly on a post-2015 process with the frequency and timetable for the associated review mechanism to be completed at COP 21. Alternatively, Parties may consider a provision requiring further considerations by COP 22 and implementation of the first review during 2017–2019. This timing would be consistent with a pre-2020 ambition strategy.

## CONCLUSION

This paper assumes that a new climate change agreement in 2015 will include some form of emission reduction or limitation targets for the next several decades and that the agreement will not be just a framework document, putting off more complicated decisions by Parties. Recognizing that Parties will soon have to reach agreement on a path to 2015, this paper tries to put forth practical, minimally disruptive options to achieve a meaningful outcome at COP 21. It aims to limit the amount of extra work, but recognizes that reaching agreement on additional information requirements will not be easy and that political flexibility will be essential at COP 19. However, if we are to have a way to assess the Parties’ emission reduction or limitation offers in 2015, the quality of information put forth by Parties needs to improve significantly. Parties must aim for more comparable and transparent information and for cooperation on a more intense and robust review process.

This paper examines the issues that Parties will need to agree on to reach a decision on a process and the degree of international guidance provided on the offers. As noted previously, we believe that some form of guidance for Parties will be an essential step to achieve a minimum level of comparability. To be timely, that guidance should be agreed on at the upcoming meeting of the COP 19 in Warsaw (November 2013) so that Parties will understand the rules of the game that will govern what is required in submissions and how they will be reviewed well in advance.

## ANNEX. TYPES OF MITIGATION COMMITMENTS<sup>36</sup>

As consideration is given to a future climate change agreement, Parties will have to choose the type of mitigation commitment to undertake. This choice will either be dictated by the country's national circumstances, particularly the political environment and national capacities, or guided by the international community. A brief description of the characteristics of targets follows:

**Base year target:** An “absolute and relative change in GHG emissions as compared to a base year” is the simplest form of target. It requires estimating only one parameter and is transparent and easy to compare with other countries' targets. Also, in contrast to intensity and baseline targets, it can more easily result in net emission reductions (if the target is framed in terms of emission reductions rather than growth).

**Intensity target:** An “absolute and relative to changes in output” adds another dimension in that the unit of output (e.g., GDP or population) needs to be measured. For example, since most countries only estimate the size of their population once every 10 years, this parameter must be estimated and subsequently revised when new population data are available.

**Baseline target:** A target set on the basis of “GHG emission intensity in relation to economic output” requires two parameters, which may be challenging for some countries with poor statistical capacity. It is more opaque than an absolute change in emissions, but it enables a country whose economy is growing and becoming more efficient to demonstrate that it is slowing the rate of emissions' growth while reducing poverty.

**Fixed-level target:** Reductions (or increases) in emissions compared with a fixed level of emissions in the target year/period, as opposed to being compared with a base year or baseline (e.g., emission reductions to zero in the target year or period in the case of carbon neutrality)

Any of these target types can be adopted for economy-wide or sectoral targets. Economy-wide targets are generally considered the most economically efficient. They offer some degree of flexibility as to how to meet the target, and their environmental effectiveness depends on the target's level of stringency. In some cases, compensatory measures may be needed to offset distributional consequences

within a country and institutional capacity may need to be enhanced, depending on the types and number of policies and measures needed to achieve the target. Comparing environmental effectiveness among countries may be difficult if countries use different accounting rules. Sectoral targets, which focus on a narrower part of the economy such as electricity generation or transportation, can be environmentally effective depending on the importance of the sector and stringency of the target, provide a degree of flexibility, and make the comparison of efforts within the same sector between countries easier. Disadvantages are that sectoral approaches may create economic inefficiency, trading across a few sectors will be inherently more expensive than trading across multiple sectors, and comparing efforts across sectors within a country may be difficult.

Another type of commitment Parties may wish to consider is a “policy or measure” commitment, which could include policies to increase renewable energy, implement performance standards on power plants, or phase-out fossil fuel subsidies. The advantage of this type of commitment is that it is closer to the national policymaking process and therefore may be more understandable and relevant to national policymakers and stakeholders. The disadvantages are that it is more difficult to account for emission reductions with a high level of certainty and, if not coupled with a national target, it would be difficult to assess the level of effort toward the 2°C target.

## ENDNOTES

1. In this context, we define ambition as a measure of a country's capacity and determination to achieve emission reductions in line with a goal of preventing global temperature to rise by 2°C.
2. UNFCCC. 2009. Copenhagen Accord. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7.
3. GWP refers to global warming potential, a measure of the relative contribution of greenhouse gases to global warming.
4. Determining the relative rolls of Parties has been an issue since the Convention came into force in 1994. The phrase "common but different responsibilities" has been used to distinguish Annex I Parties from developing non-Annex I Parties despite differences in economic performance that have emerged over the past two decades. There is, therefore, a political context imbedded in this question.
5. UNFCCC. 2009. Copenhagen Accord. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7.
6. We use the shorthand "emissions" throughout the rest of the paper to include both emissions and enhanced sequestration.
7. For the most recent summary note of the facilitator of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, see "Summary Report on the Workshop on Scope, Structure and Design of the 2015 Agreement ADP2, Part 1," Bonn, Germany, April 29, 2013.
8. How to account or determine whether a commitment has been met requires a separate set of rules, which are beyond the scope of this paper. Accounting rules are important as lax or stringent rules will have an effect on the magnitude of commitments put forth by Parties.
9. This paper uses the term "offer" rather than the term "pledge." The former term suggests a proposal or bid that can be modified based on dialogue among the Parties to future agreements, while the latter suggests a formal commitment or guarantee that has been ratified by a Party to the agreement. The authors are aware that there are differences of opinion among Parties as to how an offer process should be conducted. Some Parties believe that a one-step process to solicit a "best and final" offer would lead to the most ambitious outcome. Other Parties believe that a two-step process would achieve the best outcome and would discourage "low ball" initial offers. In such a process, Parties would submit an initial offer to be followed by a dialogue with other Parties. The Party would then have an opportunity to revise the offer. See the section, "What process should be used to finalize the offer?" for further information.
10. They can also promote mutual reassurance and reduce the possibility of technology "lock in."
11. UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.17 noted "that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to science, as documented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and that Parties should take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, consistent with science and on the basis of equity; also recognizing the need to consider, in the context of the first review of the long-term global goal, as referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 138, strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge, including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5 °C." UNFCCC. 2011. Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1.
12. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2012. The Emissions Gap Report 2012: A UNEP Synthesis Report. Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP.
13. This is likely to be a challenge. It is often the case that countries anticipate faster growth than is achieved and wish to be allowed to adjust targets based on changing national circumstances. However, if the international community wishes to assess the collective impact of the offers, then fixing a target is required.
14. Reaching rapid agreement on these parameters could be difficult if the outcome needs to wait for another negotiation. If this became obvious, an option could be to use the criteria for which there is agreement as a requirement in offers after the year 2015.
15. A comprehensive discussion of targets can be found in the IPCC's AR4, chapter 13, section 13.3.3.
16. The levels in Figure 1 require more information and are increasingly prescriptive when going from Level 1 to Level 4.
17. Guidance on some of these parameters may differ slightly depending on whether the country undertakes a national or sector-based effort. The template for reporting by the chair of the AWG-LCA in Decision-/CP.17 paragraph 5(a) could be modified slightly to incorporate additional parameters. It might also differ slightly for use in addressing sectors.
18. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 contains decision 2/CP.17, which requests in paragraph 5(a) that the secretariat develop a template. FCCC/AW-GLCA/2012/MISC.1 contains submissions from Parties that have used the template.
19. It is recognized that a request for information on costs could create a perverse incentive for some countries to inflate their anticipated costs. A review of a range of previous national studies may inhibit the temptation to inflate costs in many cases.
20. Refers to "with offer" scenario.
21. If not addressed elsewhere by the COP, Level 4 could also prescribe how accounting for emission reductions should be conducted, including base year choice and estimation, baseline scenario estimation, coverage of greenhouse gases and sectors, treatment of the land-use sector, use of transferable units, target level, and single versus multiyear target, among others.
22. This will require that targets in the form of intensity or a reduction from a baseline to be translated into a fixed target level given expected growth in the unit of output (in the case of intensity) or in baseline parameters (in the case of a baseline target).
23. For more information see table 5.2 "Checklist of information to clearly define the policy or action" in the GHG Protocol Policy and Action Standard.
24. The time period over which the GHG effects of the policy are estimated.
25. These might include responsibility and capability, development needs and vulnerability, benefits compared to costs of action, and avoided impacts of climate change.
26. Not relevant to policy-based offers.
27. Not relevant to policy-based offers.
28. UNFCCC. 2011. "Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention." FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1. Online at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf#page=4> V.
29. There is as yet no process under the SBI for the international consultation and assessment process; a delay beyond COP 19 would make this option problematic. In addition it should be noted that BURs are not forward looking and that adjustments in the mandates that govern these processes could delay an agreement on how offers should be reviewed.

30. The first five bullets in this list apply to national offers, the last applies to the collective action of all Parties.
31. Haites, Erik, Farhana Yamin, and Niklas Höhne. 2013. Possible Elements of a 2015 Legal Agreement on Climate Change. Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations: in press.
32. Haites et al., supra note 31.
33. UNEP. 1987. "Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer." Online at [http://ozone.unep.org/new\\_site/en/montreal\\_protocol.php](http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_protocol.php).
34. Haites et al., supra note 31.
35. Haites et al., suggest a commitment period of three years and a submission by January 31, 2015.
36. World Resources Institute. 2013. "Greenhouse Gas Protocol Mitigation Goals Accounting and Reporting Standard: Second Draft for Pilot Testing." Online at <http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/GHG%20Protocol%20Mitigation%20Goals%20Standard%20-%20Second%20Draft%20for%20Pilot%20Testing.pdf>.

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